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Introduction 
We have previously pointed towards the extreme profitability of the UK tobacco 
manufacturing/import market (henceforth tobacco market) when suggesting that the public 
interest would be served by regulating tobacco companies using utility company style price-
caps (Gilmore et al.,2010; Branston and Gilmore, 2014).  The profitability of the tobacco 
industry is now topical as the current UK government, and the main opposition Labour 
party, have both outlined plans for a levy on the UK tobacco industry.  The basic idea is that 
the industry should explicitly pay more towards the costs their products impose upon 
society and which are currently born by all taxpayers.  Implicit within this idea is that the 
industry is earning significant profits from which a fuller contribution could be made 
towards the societal costs engendered.  Thus, we seek to examine the current profitability 
of the UK market and comment upon the different possibilities that exist for such a levy 
since the details are not yet fixed.   To that end, in section A of this paper we explore the 
profitability of the UK tobacco market during the last five years, and then in Section B we 
comment upon the possibilities that exist for such a tobacco levy and how the industry 
might make a larger financial contribution.  Finally our conclusions are presented in Section 
C. 
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A. Tobacco industry profitability in the UK market 
 
1. Market Share 
Given that profit data for the UK tobacco market isn’t universally published, the starting 
point for estimating UK market profitability is the market share accounted for by the major 
companies operating in the UK.  We obtained market share data broken down by tobacco 
product type (cigarettes, Cigars, and RYO tobacco) from the Euromonitor passport service.  
This is reported in tables 1a, 1b, and 1c below  
Table 1a: Company Market Share (% by volume) in the UK cigarette Market 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Imperial 40.9 40.8 40.9 36.8 35.6 
JTI 35.7 35.8 36.5 36.5 38.1 
PMI 9.0 9.0 8.8 8.7 8.3 
BAT 7.5 7.5 8.1 8.6 9.0 
Others α 6.8 7.0 5.7 9.5 9.1 
Source: Euromonitor 
α
 others includes private label and the remainder of the market 
 
Table 1b: Company Market Share (% by volume) in the UK cigar Market β 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Imperial 18.4 17.8 17 17.6 18.3 
JTI 30.4 31.2 30.6 29.1 28.0 
Swisher 
International 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.3 
Scandinavian 
Tobacco 
Group 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.1 
Hunters & 
Frankau  1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 
Others α 45.1 44.9 46.6 47.8 48.5 
Source: Euromonitor 
β
 excluding cigarillos 
α
 others includes remainder of the market 
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Table 1c: Company Market Share (% by volume) in the UK RYO Tobacco Market 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Imperial 49.7 47.2 43.8 41.6 38.6 
JTI 27.3 29.3 32.5 34.8 37.6 
BAT 7.4 7.9 8.2 8.2 8.3 
Others 15.6 15.5 15.4 15.5 15.5 
Source: Euromonitor 
α
 others includes the remainder of the market 
 
In order to work out company market shares for the entire tobacco market, these individual 
product market shares need to be weighted by the respective tobacco products’ share of 
the total UK tobacco market.  The tobacco product type share of the total market is given in 
table 1d below. 
Table 1d: Product Market Share (by value) of the UK Tobacco Market (£ million) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Cigarettes 13,248.9 13,898 14,776.8 15,189.6 15,418.1 
Cigars 631.7 603 581.4 557.4 534 
Smoking 
Tobaccoµ 1,468.8 1,634 18,02.3 1,976.7 2,165.6 
Total 15,349.4 16,135.0 17,160.5 17,723.7 18,117.7 
Source: Euromonitor 
µ
 95% of smoking tobacco is RYO, with the remainder being pipe tobacco. 
  
The information in table 1d tells us that in 2009, for example, cigarettes represented 86% of 
the overall UK tobacco market value, and hence that the company market shares for 
cigarettes should be given an 86% weighting when calculating the overall company market 
shares for the combined UK tobacco market. Similarly Cigars should be weighted at 4% and 
smoking tobacco at 10%.   
Combining such weightings with the company market shares for the different products 
allow the estimation of the individual company market share for the entire UK tobacco 
market, and this information is presented in table 1e below.   
Table 1e: Company Market Shares in the UK tobacco market 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Imperial 40.8 40.6 40.4 36.7 35.4 
JTI 34.7 35.0 35.9 36.1 37.7 
PMI 7.8 7.8 7.6 7.5 7.1 
BAT 7.2 7.3 7.8 8.3 8.7 
Others 9.6 9.4 8.3 11.4 11.1 
Source: Authors calculation using data presented in tables 1a,1b and 1c.  
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The surprising result was that Imperial, the long-time market leader in the UK has actually 
lost market share in recent years, mainly to JTI the historical second player.  This can be 
seen most vividly in the market for smoking tobacco as presented in Table 1c where 
Imperial’s market share declined from 49.7% in 2009 to 38.6% in 2013, whilst market share 
for JTI increased from 27.3% in 2009 to 37.6% in 2013.  A less extreme change is seen in the 
market for cigarettes (Table 1a) where Imperial went from a 40.9% market share in 2009 to 
35.6% in 2013, whilst JTI moved from 35.7% in 2009 to 38.1% in 2013.   
This market share breakdown now needs to be utilised with profit data for each of the 
major market participants in order to estimate the total profitability of the entire industry.  
Each of these five major market participants is thus considered in turns (sections 2 to 6 
below) in order to build-up an industry wide picture of profitability.  Where actual data is 
available it is reported, but where it is not, estimates are calculated using the methods 
detailed below.  When estimates are calculated, a number of different scenarios are 
presented in order to explore the sensitivity to the assumptions taken.  These different 
scenarios are then also used when calculating entire industry profitability in section 7. 
 
2. Imperial Tobacco 
Imperial Tobacco (IT), has long been the market leader for tobacco products in the UK and 
as such they have traditionally produced figures for their specific UK performance as 
detailed in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: The Profitability of Imperial Tobacco in the UK 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Net Revenue (£ Million) 893 911 869 936 915 
Adjusted Operating profit (£ Million) 601 614 577 627 623 
Profit Margin 0.673 0.674 0.664 0.670 0.681 
Source: various Imperial Tobacco annual reports and author’s calculation thereon. 
 
The table shows that IT is a very profitable organisation, and despite losing market share in 
recent years, it has been able to earn consistently high profits with a very large profit 
margin.   By way of a comparison, Branston (2014) reports that firms in comparable 
consumer staple industries typically made a profit margin in the range of 12-20%. 
 
3. Japan Tobacco International 
JTI does not produce profit data for the UK alone as individual national markets are 
aggregated in the Japan Tobacco accounts.  However, the origins of the UK operations of JTI 
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were the UK based Gallaher company, and this still exists as a subsidiary company for which 
the accounts are a matter of public record.  The Gallaher subsidiary is a focussed UK 
manufacturer and distributor of tobacco with very limited international operations. 
Table 3a: The profitability of Gallaher Limited in the UK 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Turnover (£ Million) 4,473 4,539 4,580 4,740 4,797 
Duty paid (£ Million) 3,574 3,642 3,777 3,938 3,935 
UK Operating Profit (£ Million) 312 345 140 156 152 
UK Turnover (£ Million) 4,253 4,344 4,510 4,711 4,766 
UK turnover as a proportion of total 
turnover 0.951 0.957 0.985 0.994 0.994 
Estimated UK Duty (£ Million) 3,398.2 3,485.5 3,719.3 3,913.9 3,909.6 
Estimated UK Net Revenue (£ million) 854.8 858.5 790.7 797.1 856.4 
Profit Margin 0.365 0.402 0.177 0.196 0.177 
Source: various Gallaher Limited annual reports and author’s calculation thereon. 
Whilst Gallaher provides information on UK profits and UK revenue, it doesn’t provide 
information on UK net revenues (revenue after duty is paid) which are need to calculate UK 
profit margins.     Duty is given only for total sales, so we assigned to the UK market a 
proportion of total duty paid in line with the UK revenues as a proportion of total company 
revenues.  The resulting figures look to be in line with the net revenues reported by 
Imperial. 
 
However, the reported figures for Gallaher can’t be taken as a perfect record of the 
profitability of JTI in the UK market.  At the end of 2010, Gallaher was re-organised such that 
a number of brands previously owned directly by the company were sold to another JTI 
subsidiary, and as a result data from this point onwards shows that company “profit is 
substantially lower than [in] prior years, reflecting lower margins earned by the company as 
a limit risk distributor for brands now owned by JTI SA” (Gallaher, 2011, P.4).  This doesn’t 
mean that JTI tobacco operations in the UK were suddenly less profitable, but simply that 
the profits derived are accounted for in different JTI subsidiaries for which data is not 
available.  As such, it is necessary to estimate UK profitability using the published data as a 
guide and this is what is done in table 3b. Given the large market share account for by JTI, 
differing estimates of profitability will have a significant impact on the overall profitability of 
the UK tobacco market.  As such we present a number of scenarios for the possible 
profitability of the company, each of which is explained below. 
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Table 3b: Estimated Profitability of JTI in the UK 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Conservative scenario (£ million) 312 345 288.6 290.9 312.6 
Less conservative scenario (£ million) 312 345 317.9 320.4 344.3 
Gallaher scenario (£ million) 458.6 460.6 424.2 427.6 459.5 
Imperial scenario (£ Million) 510.6 529.0 512.5 615.8 663.3 
Source: author’s own calculations. 
Our ‘conservative scenario’ uses the 0.365% margin observed in 2009 to estimate 
profitability in the UK market for the years 2011-13 for which the published profit 
information is unreliable due to the accounting change.  This margin is applied to the 
estimated net revenue calculated for each year in table 3a.  Similarly, our ‘less conservative 
scenario’ used the 40% margin observed in 2010 in the same fashion.  However, these 
estimates seem very low when compared to the reported profit figures for Imperial.  
Furthermore, Gallaher as an independent company reported EBITA margins (a similar 
concept to operating profit margin) for the UK market of 53.2% in 2004 and 54.1% in 2005, 
just before it was taken over by JTI (Gallaher, 2006).  Therefore in our ‘Gallaher scenario’ we 
estimate profits based on a return of 53.65% (the average of 2004 and 2005) as all 
indications are the market in recent is at least as profitable as it was at that point in time.  
The difference between this rate of profit and that reported by the JTI Gallaher subsidiary as 
detailed in table 3a might be due to other accounting changes introduced after the purchase 
by JTI.  We therefore suggest that the Gallaher scenario figures could be very plausible given 
the reported data for Imperial which has a similar market share, and also in light of the fact 
that the JT stated that for the 2013 financial year they had a market share of 40.7% but 
41.0% of the market value suggesting that the company was slightly more profitable than 
average (JT, 2014, pp.30).   Finally we present our most aggressive ‘imperial scenario’ where 
we assume that JTI was able to earn the same rate of profits IT, and hence the profit figures 
for this are generated by using JTI’s market share (reported in table 1e) at the Imperial profit 
rate for that year.  For instance, in 2009 IT had a market share of 40.8% and earned £601m, 
suggesting that each 1% of the market was worth £14.72m in profit, and thus we can 
estimate that JTI, with 34.7% of the market would have earned £510.6m. 
 
4. Philip Morris International  
Philip Morris International (PMI) does not provide UK-specific data since it reports on an EU 
basis, the detail of which is reported in table 4a below.  They do have a subsidiary operating 
in the UK but the finances of this are such that it can’t possibility represent anything like 
their full operations in the UK given their observed market share.   
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Table 4a: The profitability of PMI in the EU 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Net Revenue (US$ Million) 9,041 8,983 9,212 8,526 8,596 
Operating Income (US$ Million) 4,506 4,502 4,560 4,187 4,238 
Profit Margin 0.498 0.501 0.495 0.491 0.493 
Source: various PMI annual reports and author’s calculation thereon. 
The profit margins detailed for PMI in the EU are approximately in line with the observed 
profitability of IT in the UK and also the reported (and estimated) UK profit data for JTI.   
However, this information isn’t on its own sufficient but it can help in the development of 
some estimates for the profits earned in the UK market and this is what is reported in table 
4b below.  As with JTI, we present various profit scenarios. 
 
Table 4b: Estimated Profitability of PMI in the UK 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Conservative scenario (£ million) 
 84.7 87.2 80.7 93.3 89.9 
Gallaher scenario (£ million) 91.2 93.3 87.5 101.9 97.8 
Imperial scenario (£ million) 114.4 117.3 108.2 127.3 124.1 
Source: author’s calculation using data presented in previous tables. 
Our conservative scenario estimates the profitability of PMI using the observed net revenue 
information for IT, adjusting this for the appropriate market shares of the two companies, 
and then applying the report EU level of profitability.  For instance, in 2009 IT had a market 
share of 40.8% and net revenue of £893m.  Therefore each 1% of market share was worth 
£21.9m of revenue.  Thus, if PMI were able to perform at this level, then they would have 
generated net revenues of £170m given their market share of 7.76%.  The reported profit 
rate of 49.8% for the EU as a whole suggests this level of revenue generation would have 
created profit for the UK market of £84.7m. A similar calculation was done using the 
reported revenues for Gallaher Limited.  These have not been presented due to the change 
in accounting practices utilised part way through the period of interest.  For reference such 
calculations implied profits for PMI of £95.4m in 2009, but then there was a significant dip 
from 2011 (£82.7m) and onwards when the account change was introduced, suggesting 
such an approach would be unreliable. 
The profile of PMI in the UK is such that their operations are concentrated towards the 
premium end of the cigarette market, selling brands such as Marlborough and Chesterfield.  
These products will be amongst the most profitable since they have amongst the highest 
retail prices but incur very similar costs of production to other cigarettes brands.  As such it 
is likely that the EU profit rates under-estimate the profitability of the UK market for PMI.  In 
order to account for this we present the ‘Gallaher’ scenario where the profit margin is 
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assumed to be the 53.65% profit rate that Gallaher Plc averaged in the UK market over 2004 
and 2005.  Similarly, we also present our most aggressive Imperial scenario where we 
assume that PMI was able to earn the same rate of profits as IT reported in each year, and 
hence the profit figures for this are generated by using PMI’s market share at the IT profit 
rate for that year.   
 
5. British American Tobacco 
British American Tobacco (BAT) does not provide UK-specific data since it includes the UK 
within its ‘Western Europe’ market area, which also includes: Belgium; The Czech Republic; 
Denmark; France; Germany; Italy; Netherlands; Poland; Romania; Spain; Sweden; and 
Switzerland.  The performance of this region for BAT is detailed in table 5a below.  Like with 
PMI, they do have a subsidiary operating in the UK, but the finances of this are such that it 
can’t possibility represent anything like their full operations in the UK given their market 
share.   
 
 
Table 5a: The profitability of BAT in their Western Europe Region 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Revenue (£ Million) 3,884 3,419 3,600 3,442 3,635 
Adjusted Profit (£ Million) 994 1,054 1,228 1,186 1,273 
Profit Margin 0.2559 0.3083 0.3411 0.3446 0.3502 
Source: various BAT annual reports and author’s calculation thereon 
The profitability of BAT in this region seems to be significantly less than the other profit data 
considered thus far.  It might be that BAT is simply less profitable than the other 
manufacturers or more likely, that the wider regional nature of the accounting sees the 
profitable UK market mixed with other less profitable markets in Europe.  In order to 
account for both possibilities we again develop several estimates for the profits earned in 
the UK market and these are presented in table 5b below.  
 
Table 5b: Estimated Profitability of BAT in the UK 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Conservative scenario (£ million) 
 40.2 50.2 57.5 72.7 78.2 
Gallaher scenario (£ million) 84.3 87.4 90.4 113.3 119.8 
Imperial scenario (£ million) 105.7 109.8 111.9 141.4 152.0 
Source: author’s calculation using data presented in previous tables. 
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Our three scenarios utilise the same basic approaches as were detailed for PMI, except that 
the BAT market share and regional profit information is used.    All of these scenarios are 
consistent with the rising returns observed for the wider Western Europe region as reported 
in table 5a and also the increasing market share detailed in table 1.  Furthermore, they also 
seem to be in line with comments that BAT made in its annual reports for the period in 
question.  For instance, when reporting on the 2010 corporate performance they report that 
the UK market generated a “significant increase in profits” (BAT, 2011, p.30), whilst for 2011 
the UK generated “higher profit” BAT, 2012, p. 30), whilst the reports for 2012 and 2013 
both suggested that UK “profits grew strongly” (BAT, 2013, p28; BAT, 2014, p.34). 
 
6. Others 
The remainder of the UK tobacco market, which we have labelled as ‘others’, is more 
difficult to estimate because by definition it includes all other companies that operate in the 
UK market, including cigar focussed firms and those making own label or more niche brands.  
In order to estimate the profitability of this sector we again present several scenarios. 
Table 6: Estimated Profitability of the Remainder of the UK Market 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Conservative scenario (£ million) 
 0 0 0 0 0 
Less Conservative scenario (£ million) 
 53.5 65.2 61.0 100.5 100.3 
Gallaher scenario (£ million) 112.2 113.5 95.9 156.5 153.6 
Imperial scenario (£ million) 140.7 142.6 118.7 195.4 195.0 
 
In our conservative scenario we assume that the remainder of the market is so fragmented 
that it doesn’t generate any significant profits.  This is however, highly unlikely when (for 
instance) we consider the fact that at least 50% of the cigar market is included in this ‘other’ 
category for each of the years in question.   As such our less conservative scenario assumes 
that remainder of the UK market is as profitable as the Western Europe tobacco market 
reported by BAT in each year.  This is at the low end of the reported profitability we have 
examined thus far, and allows for the fact that some parts of the market might generate low 
profits, whilst other parts are as highly profitable.     Finally, we also present our Gallaher 
and Imperial scenarios in order to illustrate the likely upper limit for profitability in order to 
consider the possibility that these niche firms could be relatively small but highly profitable. 
The methodology for calculating all of these profits estimates is the same as that employed 
when discussing PMI and BAT above.  For example, in 2009 IT had net revenues of £893m 
and adjusted profits of £601m from a market share of 40.8%, which suggests that each 1% 
of the market was worth £21.9m in revenues and £14.7m in profits.   In 2009 the other 
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segment of the market was 9.5% of the total, which suggests net revenues of £209m, and 
thus profits for our gallaher scenario of £112.2m given the aforementioned assumption of a 
profit margin of 53.65%.  It also suggests profits for our imperial scenario of £140.7m given 
the  £14.7m IT earned from each 1% market share. 
 
7.  Overall Profitability of the UK Tobacco market 
Combining all the profit estimates for the individual companies from the sections above 
allows us to work out estimates of the profitability for the entire tobacco sector in the UK.  
We present these estimates for total profitability using the different scenarios that we have 
developed for each of the companies above. 
 
Table 7: Estimated Profitability of the UK Tobacco Market 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Conservative scenario (£ million) 
 1,037.9 1,096.4 1,003.8 1,084.0 1,103.7 
Less Conservative scenario (£ million) 
 1,091.4 1,161.7 1,094.1 1,214.0 1,235.7 
Gallaher scenario (£ million) 1,347.2 1,368.9 1,275.0 1,426.4 1,453.7 
Imperial scenario (£ million) 1,472.5 1,512.7 1,428.4 1,707.0 1,757.5 
 
In all scenarios we use the actual reported data for IT, and then our conservative scenario 
utilises our conservative estimate for each element of the market.  Our less conservative 
estimate utilises the less conservative estimate where developed, and the conservative 
estimate where it isn’t.    It is interesting to note that all scenarios show a slight reduction in 
aggregate profitability in 2011.  This is a reflection of the fact that all scenarios rely to a 
greater or lesser extent on either the profit or revenue data reported by IT, and both of 
these fell in 2011 before recovering thereafter.  It is unclear for the exact reasons for this 
anomaly in the performance of IT as the company simply cites a change in “trade buying 
patterns” alongside the continued reduction in cigarette volumes for the dip relative to the 
previous years (Imperial Tobacco, 2012, p.22).  The existence of this explains why the 
aggregate estimates for 2011 move slightly away from the observed upward trend in the 
other years covered. 
All estimated scenarios show that in recent years the UK tobacco market has generated 
operating profits of more than a billion pounds, and even the conservative scenario shows 
profits reaching £1.1bn by 2013.  Furthermore, all but our rather unrealistic conservative 
scenario show that profits have risen by more than 10% during this five year period, despite 
this being a time of falling total tobacco sales.  For instance cigarettes have declined from 
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47,725 million sticks in 2009 to 38,390 million sticks in 2013, and whilst it is true some of 
this will have been compensated for by increases in RYO tobacco sales, the overall trend in 
overall sales volumes is a clearly downwards (Euromonitor). 
It is perhaps a little optimistic to suggest that all tobacco companies operating in the UK 
would be as profitable as IT (as per the Imperial scenario) but the profit margin of 53.65% 
assumed in the Gallaher scenario can be seem to be very realistic in that it is consistent with 
the reported profit rate for IT, JTI, and PMI which account for the vast majority of the UK 
market.   As such it seems reasonable to estimate that the profits generated in 2012 and 
2013 were in the region of £1.5bn annually. 
 
B. The Proposed Levy on Tobacco Companies 
Such large annual profits,  the deadly nature of tobacco and the on-going need to address 
the government budget deficit have made the issue of a special levy on tobacco 
manufacturing/import companies politically attractive, with the UK government conducting 
a public consultation on this issue between December 2014 and February 2015.   However, 
this isn’t a UK phenomenon in that Hungary is also considering a one-time tax on tobacco 
industry revenues
1
 and the US has the tobacco industry ‘user fee’ as established by the 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009.  The idea in the UK context is 
still at a very early stage in that it isn’t yet clear how such a levy would be applied to the 
tobacco industry.  Since there are a number of options that could be considered for such a 
policy, we now seek to comment upon the various possibilities that exist in regards to the 
introduction of a special tobacco levy. 
 
8. A revenue based levy 
One suggestion is that the levy would be implemented on company revenues, as this would 
be administratively easy to implement   This might be done on a fee per stick (or stick 
equivalent) basis or simply as a proportion of the total sales revenue generated for each 
company.   Both are essentially market share based approaches, with the market share 
being determined by sales volumes in the first case and by revenue earned in the second.  
At first glance such a levy would suggest it is just another sales tax on tobacco products but 
with a different name.   In many ways this is true and recent experience suggests that such a 
tax rise would simply be passed on to consumers in the form of higher retail prices.   
However, such price increases are seen to be one of the most effective tobacco control 
measures available (IARC, 2011) and therefore anything that might raise the price that 
consumer have to pay for tobacco should be welcomed.   Previous work suggests that a 
                                                          
1
 See http://www.portfolio.hu/en/economy/hungary_to_slap_special_tax_on_tobacco_companies.28688.html 
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proportionate form of tobacco taxation is likely to exacerbate retail price differentials 
between brands and products, and hence that a fixed fee per stick approach should be 
preferred (Gilmore et al., 2010).    
The industry would no doubt counter the introduction of such a levy with suggestions that 
they pay enough tax already and high prices would increase incentives for smuggled and/or 
illicit tobacco.  Such arguments are not new and it is for an elected government to decide 
rates of tax on any and all products, and smuggling is an issue of law enforcement rather 
than a fundamental weakness in the suggested levy.  Furthermore, existing work shows that 
while making such arguments (i.e. that price rises stimulate the illicit market) tobacco 
companies have continued to increase their prices and profits (see Gilmore and Reed, 2014; 
Gilmore et al, 2013; and Howell, 2012).  They are unlikely to have increased their prices to 
the extent they did if they genuinely believed this was the main driver of the illicit trade.  
The key difference that might differentiate such a levy from existing tobacco taxation is the 
idea that the money generated could be hypothecated for measures to reduce the harm 
caused by tobacco to society, such as encouraging quitting and discouraging uptake.  If this 
were to be done then it would be a recognition that tobacco is unique in causing harm no 
matter what the quantity of consumption and hence that the industry should pay to help 
current users stop, and/or to explicitly contribute towards the cost their products impose on 
the NHS.  Furthermore, such a levy could be differentiated from existing tobacco taxation if 
it were managed completely independently of existing tobacco taxes and was calculated 
annually based on the financial needs of the services that are being funded.  In this way, 
such a tobacco levy might be a British equivalent of the ‘user fee’ established in the USA.  
The UK doesn’t have a strong tradition of hypothecated taxes in that most revenue is pooled 
centrally and then used to fund the chosen overall spending patterns.  However, there are 
some precedents, such as the TV Licence scheme, which is a tax in all but name and which 
generates money that is hypothecated inasmuch as it is primarily used to fund the activities 
of the BBC.    Furthermore, the UK is also under-going political change with further 
devolution being offered to Scotland, and to a lesser extent, Wales and North Ireland.    
These changes include reform of taxation where the raising and spending of more taxes will 
now be devolved, and as such we are starting to see changes in the traditional UK way of 
centralised tax and spending.  This presents possibilities for a hypothecated revenue based 
tobacco levy.     
Another parallel might be the Energy Companies Obligation, where larger companies in the 
energy industry are required to invest in energy efficiency of their customers.  Funds are not 
granted to the government but are spent by the industry on appropriate activities (see 
Ofgem for further details).   Similarly a tobacco levy could be viewed as being in line with the 
levies that are paid by utility companies in order to fund their sector specific independent 
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regulation.
2
   A tobacco levy could therefore be independent of the government in the same 
way as these examples, with the money directly paid to the appropriate cause, such as 
tobacco cessation services.  Such an approach would also be consistent with the idea of a 
fixed fee approach to such a levy in that the harm cause by tobacco is the same irrespective 
of which particular brand is consumed, so a fixed fee is consistent with the ‘user pays 
principle’ embodied in the whole idea of a revenue based levy. 
A revenue based levy would be easy to apply given the existing mechanisms that facilitate 
the collection of the taxation that are currently applied to tobacco products.  However, it 
would engender no wider change in the tobacco industry in that the companies would still 
have the incentive (as now) to behave in a way that would maximise their profits which 
would also continue to accrue to their shareholders.  As we have already seen, these profits 
are considerable in the UK and given the harm that tobacco products cause, they are clearly 
being earned at the expense of the health and wellbeing of the British public.  Furthermore, 
under the European Tobacco Tax Directive there are limits on the extent to which 
governments can levy specific (i.e. not proportional) taxes on tobacco products, which will 
clearly limit the scope for the type of revenue based levy that could be applied.  
 
 
9. A profit based levy 
 
Another approach to a new tobacco levy might be one based on the profit made by the 
tobacco manufacturing/import industry, as this would be something that the industry 
couldn’t simply pass on to consumers.    This might be politically attractive in that it could be 
directly publicised as the industry being forced to surrender some of their massive profits to 
cover some of the costs they are imposing on society, especially if the resulting revenues 
were to be explicitly hypothecated as discussed above.    Indeed, since the monies raised 
would be coming directly from the companies, it could be considered desirable that some of 
the money raised be hypothecated for further work on illicit tobacco, as then the industry 
would be paying to address a problem it has been found to be complicit.  Not only would 
this help raise further tax revenue but it would also help remove any future arguments that 
illicit tobacco prevents future public health measures. 
 
Given that BAT and Imperial are both headquartered in the UK, any profit based tobacco 
levy would need to be explicitly targeted at just the UK market operations (i.e. the 
manufacture for and sale of tobacco products to UK consumers) rather than their entire 
corporate activities reported in the UK.  If the latter was attempted then the companies 
would simply re-locate their base outside the UK, costing jobs and corporate taxes.  
                                                          
2
 See, for example, http://waterbriefing.org/home/regulation-and-legislation/item/9710-ofwat-confirms-
increase-in-water-companies-licence-fee-cap-to-fund-2014-price-review 
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Something more targeted at the UK market operations would not encourage such action 
since such a levy would be paid irrespective of whether the companies were to leave the UK 
or not. 
 
The drawback of this particular approach is that it would be a lot harder to implement than 
a levy on revenue.  As we have seen in the earlier part of this paper when considering the 
profitability of the UK operations of JTI (and also to a lesser extent the operations of PMI), 
accounting changes and corporate forms can be easily introduced which significantly reduce 
the profits reported in any one jurisdiction.  Profits that are hidden are clearly hard to tax.  
However, such issues can’t be insurmountable.     The UK government has already 
announced its intention to bring forth tax reform to address the lack of taxation paid by 
large transnational companies (such as Google, Amazon or Starbucks) who have a large 
turnover in the UK but funnel the associated profits  outside the UK via the use of 
subsidiaries registered in other locations, thereby avoiding UK corporate taxes.  Tobacco 
companies might well be doing this too given the observed accounting changes introduced 
by JTI and the small size of the aforementioned UK subsidiary of PMI.  The exact detail of 
this so called ‘Google Tax’ are as yet unclear but the stated aim is clearly very relevant to the 
idea of a profit based tobacco levy.   It suggests that companies won’t be able to hide their 
profits with accounting tricks in the future.   Furthermore, any insights gain from following 
this Google Tax approach might be supplemented by the use of historical data, such as that 
developed earlier in this paper, and companies could even be required to make relevant 
data available as part of a law to introduce such a levy.   Furthermore, even if such 
approaches result in estimates of corporate profits that are imperfect, such estimate would 
still allow a profit-based levy to be imposed as it would just mean the levy didn’t raise as 
much in practice as it could in theory generate.   This sounds less than perfect but in practice 
applies to all taxes, as no tax actually generates its full yield due to tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. 
 
A profit based levy would no doubt be harder (and likely more costly) to implement as a 
scheme, but it has the advantage of being something completely new and a form of taxation 
that the industry itself would have to pay.   The industry would not be able to shift the 
burden onto consumers because the levy would be calculated based on their profits earned 
rather than their sales figures or revenue.  More profit for the industry, or any particular 
company within it, would mean higher levy payments.   As such it would slightly reduce the 
incentive the industry faces when seeking higher profits,  as any additional profits earned 
would not accrue entirely to shareholders as some of this would now be captured in higher 
levy payments.    The effects of this change in incentive is likely to be small, depending on 
the size of the levy implemented, but it is certainly conceivable that on occasion such a levy 
would mean the likely benefits to the company of any particular policy (e.g. marketing to 
children) would now be smaller relative to the costs of pursuing it (e.g. loss of goodwill 
should the policy be revealed). 
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10. A price cap alternative 
Both approaches to a tobacco levy have much merit, and are therefore to be encouraged, 
especially if the resulting funds were to be appropriately hypothecated.  In many ways both 
variants for the levy  represent a continuation of existing tobacco control strategies and 
might therefore be appropriately viewed as a welcome next step.  However, neither has the 
extent of the benefits that would be realised with the policy of capping the wholesale prices 
tobacco manufacturers are able to charge.  This policy has been outlined in detail previously 
(Gilmore et al., 2010; Branston and Gilmore, 2014) but in short an industry regulator 
capping price would bring a variety of public health benefits and would also raise 
significantly more tax revenue since the majority of the current manufacturer profits (as 
detailed above) would be captured as tax revenue.
3
  As such it could be considered a more 
desirable and bolder alternative to a levy.  Indeed, it is also very much in keep with current 
UK government thinking given the consultation on the levy to raise money from the tobacco 
industry, and the recent introduction of a cap on the rate of interest that that can be 
charged by so-called ‘payday lenders’ such as Wonga.
4
   
 
However, capping prices and a tobacco levy need not be seen as being mutually exclusive 
either/or type of ideas, as a levy might be a useful intermediate step that helps to facilitate 
the introduction of price caps in the future.  Since price caps would actually reduce the 
prices that manufacturers are free to charge, such a capping scheme would actually 
                                                          
3
 As summarised in Branston and Gilmore (2014, p. 2) “Public health benefits occur both because of the 
reduction in profits and the incentives this engenders, and because a regulatory agency charged with capping 
tobacco manufacturers’ prices would be required to investigate all aspects of the tobacco industry, thus 
exposing it to greater scrutiny than ever before. Most obviously, price-cap regulation prevents the tobacco 
industry from using price to market its products or undermine the impact of tobacco excise policies because 
maximum prices would now be set by the regulator and reduced industry profits would significantly impair its 
ability to cut any prices below these. Price differences between brands/products would, therefore, be mainly 
based on the costs of production rather than attempts to segment the market by price, which should 
significantly reduce the problem of down-trading to cheaper brands/products. Indeed, the suppression of 
pricing strategy from the arsenal of the transnational tobacco companies would be a complementary policy to 
other tobacco control measures, as it would essentially prevent the companies from using price changes as a 
defence in response to public health measures, such as plain packaging, and might even reduce their future 
resistance to such measures as their profitability becomes partially insulated from them, as the price caps set 
would take account of the impact of such measures. Furthermore, price-cap regulation could offer a means of 
controlling other unwanted industry practices, such as price fixing, cigarette smuggling and marketing to the 
young, as the regulator would be able to identify such activity and then take it into account when setting the 
price caps. For example, by forbidding, or tightly restricting the marketing budget if the companies are 
marketing to children. Companies could be regulated based only on their legal activities (so that they do not 
benefit from illegal activities, such as smuggling) and potentially even penalised for any undesirable activity in 
order to provide a strong incentive to act responsibly. There is also significant potential to generate indirect 
public health benefits through the reduction in the money the industry has available to spend on lobbying or 
fighting public health measures.”   
4
 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-30641877, accessed on 20
th
 January 2015 
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complement the introduction of a revenue based tobacco levy in that the rate of such a levy 
could be increased at the point the caps were introduced so that retail prices don’t drop.  
Furthermore, a profit based levy might actually ‘pave the way’ for price caps in that it would 
allow the government to argue that price caps were implemented not to raise money from 
company profits (since the profit based levy does that already) but for public health reasons, 
thus helping to simplify the legal process of introducing such a measure.   
ASH funded a preliminary investigation into the compatibility of such price caps with EU law, 
and this suggested that various aspects of the Tobacco Tax Directive (TTD), and EU rules on 
competition, free movement of goods and establishment might prove problematic.  
However, nothing can be definitive in this regard until an attempt is made to introduce such 
a policy and the arguments played out in the setting of a court.  Such a bold tobacco control 
strategy will always give rise to legal challenges from the industry when the companies have 
so much profit to lose.  The nature of the law is that there will always be grounds on which a 
case could be brought.  Furthermore, there are routes to see how such legal difficulties 
might be bypassed or mitigated.  For instance, the major political party in the current UK 
coalition government (the Conservative party) has committed to pursuing a re-negotiation 
of the UK’s relationship with the EU, so freedom to implement price caps might be one such 
consideration requested.  Moreover, reform has recently taken place in regards to the EU 
position on the growing of GM crops.  This was previously an issue decided upon at the EU 
level, but after disagreement between member states as to the attractiveness of GM crops, 
reform was agreed in January 2015 which changed this to be an issue determined at the 
national level, thus allowing some countries to block GM crops whilst others authorise it.
5
  
Such changes and wider political environment suggest that the UK government should take 
advantage of the forthcoming review of the TTD to seek appropriate revisions to facilitate 
the implementation of price caps. 
 
C. Conclusions 
We have developed estimates that show that the manufacture of tobacco products for the 
UK market is enormously profitable, with the industry generating more than a £1bn each 
year on very high profit margins.  These profits are earned by producing a product that is 
estimated to cost society in England approximately £12.9bn a year (ASH, 2014).  The UK 
wide figure will be considerably more.  It is therefore no surprise that politicians are finding 
it attractive to contemplate the industry being made to pay more through a new tobacco 
levy.  A revenue based levy would be relatively easy to implement but would need to be 
differentiated if it wasn’t seen to be just another sales tax on tobacco produced.  One 
obvious way would be to hypothecate the revenue generated, so the levy in essence 
becomes a ‘user fee’ paying to reduce the harm caused by tobacco to society.  Such a levy 
                                                          
5
 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30794256, accessed on 20
th
 January 2015 
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would likely be passed on to consumers.   A profit based levy would be something genuinely 
new, would be impossible to pass on to consumers, but would be more challenging to 
implement.  As we detailed above when looking at JTI, accounting changes can be 
introduced which hide profits in particular markets, so measures to address this would need 
to be included in such an approach to the levy.  Finally we would suggest that any form of 
tobacco levy should be considered an intermediate goal because utility style price caps 
offering better financial and public health prospects. 
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